Tuesday, December 19, 2006

A Government of National Unity?

Well, there's one thing all the American pundits and so-called experts agree upon. Not troop levels, not tactics, not strategy, not politics or economics or rebuilding. Nope, there's any number of opinions about these essential details. But everyone is certain of one thing - these gosh darn Militias have got to go. Most of the vitriol is aimed at Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army, but there are others just as determined that we must somehow eliminate the Badr Brigades, and even to some extent the Kurdish Peshmerga.

There are various subtle differences in these schools of thought. Some say we must "crush" the Militias, some say we must "confront" the Militias. Others think in terms of "elimination", "marginalization" or "disband". But to a very great extent these are code words. What they are actually calling for is an armed confrontation, a declaration of war, if you will, against the Mehdi Army first, then on to the others if necessary.

When I hear this I shake my head and wonder just exactly how this is supposed to work, what is the desired outcome, and are we likely to get there in this manner? In many ways it feels like the run-up to the war itself in late 2002/early 2003. Sure, we know that with our air power, our artillery, our armor, our ability to move around the city and control the movements of others, we could defeat them militarily. But it's like its anathema to think about what happens next. You know, short-term, mid-term, long-term and unexpected consequences?

There seems to be this belief, even at this late date, that we can attack a militia, fight a one or two week battle, they will no longer be a factor. Just like that, they'd be gone. As a reminder, the Russians have been fighting the Chechnyan separatists for 13 years, and it has been seven years since Russian air and artillery flattened Grozny, the capital. They are still fighting. And look how well the Israelis have done eliminating Hezbollah. And Sri Lanka had no problem making the Tamil Tigers a non-issue. Not to mention the US Marines success with the Sunni Insurgency. Anybody in 2006, after witnessing the last fifty years of armed conflict, who still thinks that a regular army with it's air, artillery and armor, can defeat a guerrilla army with popular support, is dangerously stupid and should not be allowed to play around the levers of power.

So if the US decides to make this "Surge", and they bring the war to the Mehdi Army, what might happen? Well, the outcome would be on a scale from Terrible to Disasterous. Muqtada al-Sadr is the nominal leader of an urban social movement. Shiite muslims, Iraq Nationalists, they both form a key part of the coalition that brought Maliki to power and serve as a thorn in his side. In general, they are not on terribly friendly terms with al-Hakim's SCIRI and it's militia, the Badr Brigades, primarily due to SCIRI's alignment with Iran, Iraq's traditional enemy.

First, how many Iraqi soldiers and police are loyal to al Sadr? What will they do. What will his fellow Shiites do? Will they stand back and watch the elimination of a rival, once again courtesy the US taxpayer? Or might they recognize that they would likely be next and make a temporary alliance of convenience to fight the Americans. What will the Iraqi government think about large scale urban combat tearing apart the capitol city? What will the Sunnis and the insurgency do? Will they step back and let their two enemies, the Shi'a and the Americans bleed each other while they rearm and refit? Or will they recognize it as an opportunity to join forces with other Iraqis to raise the stakes in their fight against the occupying army? And what about Iran? If the Saudis have already stated that if the Americans pull out they will support the Sunnis in Iraq, would it not be expected that the Iranians might support their Iraqi bretheren when they are under assault?

I won't pretend to know enough about the complex relationships in the region to make a real prediction, but it is telling that it is impssible to imagine an outcome that would be better than awful. The only possible upside to starting down this path of fighting the Shiite militias would be to unite the Iraqi population in the common cause of driving the Americans off their soil. We may well achieve the oft-stated goal of Iraqi National Unity, but not in the way we intended it...

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